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THE GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL VERDICT AND PLEA IN
NEW MEXICO
LUIS G. STELZNER*
ROSANNE PIATI'**

I. INTRODUCTION

A. The New Law
On March 8, 1982, the Governor signed Senate Bill No. 99 into law.'
The new law, which became effective in May 1982, provides for a plea
and verdict of "guilty but mentally ill" ("GBMI") in New Mexico. The
statute states that a person who was not insane but was suffering from a
*Associate Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law
**J.D., University of New Mexico School of Law, 1983
1. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-9-3 (Cum. Supp. 1982). Section 31-9-3 provides:
A. A person who at the time of the commission of a criminal offense was not insane but
was suffering from a mental illness is not relieved of criminal responsibility for his
conduct and may be found guilty but mentally ill. As used in this section, "mentally
ill" means a substantial disorder of thought, mood or behavior which afflicted a person
at the time of the commission of the offense and which impaired that person's judgment,
but not to the extent that he did not know what he was doing or understand the consequences of his act or did not know that his act was wrong or could not prevent himself
from committing the act.
B. A plea or finding of guilty but mentally ill is not an affirmative defense but an alternative
plea or finding that may be accepted or made pursuant to appropriate evidence when
the affirmative defense of insanity is raised or the plea of guilty but mentally ill is made.
C. A plea of guilty but mentally ill shall not be accepted until the defendant has undergone
examination by a clinical psychologist or psychiatrist and the court has examined the
psychological or psychiatric reports, held a hearing on the issue of the defendant's mental
condition and is satisfied that there is a factual basis that the defendant was mentally ill
at the time of the offense to which the plea is entered.
D. When a defendant has asserted a defense of insanity, the court may find the defendant
guilty but mentally ill if after hearing all of the evidence the court finds beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant:
(1)is guilty of the offense charged;
(2) was mentally ill at the time of the commission of the offense; and
(3) was not legally insane at the time of the commission of the offense.
E. When a defendant has asserted a defense of insanity, the court, where warranted by the
evidence, shall provide the jury with a special verdict form of guilty but mentally ill
and shall separately instruct the jury that a verdict of guilty but mentally ill may be
returned instead of a verdict of guilty or not guilty, and that such a verdict requires a
finding by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offense
charged and that the defendant was not legally insane at the time of the commission of
the offense but that he was mentally ill at that time.
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"mental illness" at the time of the commission of the crime charged may
be found GBMI. The statute defines mental illness as:
a substantial disorder of thought, mood or behavior which afflicted
a person at the time of the commission of the offense and which
impaired that person's judgment, but not to the extent that he did
not know what he was doing or understand the consequences of his
act or did not know that his act was wrong or could not prevent
himself from committing the act.2
The statute provides that the trier of fact may enter the new verdict under
two circumstances: 1) when the defendant raises the insanity defense and
the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant (a) is
guilty of the offense charged; (b) was mentally ill at the time of the
commission of the offense; and (c) was not legally insane at the time of
the commission of the offense; or 2) when the defendant pleads guilty
but mentally ill, a psychologist or psychiatrist examines the defendant,
and the court holds a hearing and determines that there is a factual basis
to the plea.'
The statute provides that upon a finding of GBMI, the court may impose
any sentence appropriate for the offense. However, if the defendant is
sentenced to the custody of the Department of Corrections, that entity
shall examine the defendant and provide such psychiatric treatment "as
it deems necessary." 4 Evidently, a verdict of GBMI does not in any way
limit the sentencing options of the trial judge. The judge may, for instance,
still place a defendant on probation. In that case, the provisions regarding
treatment would be inapplicable because they only apply when a defendant
is committed to the Department of Corrections. Presumably, a judge
could, nevertheless, condition probation on arrangements for psychiatric
treatment, including commitment to an appropriate facility.'
There is a potentially significant loophole in the new GBMI statute.
The trier of fact can enter a GBMI verdict only when the defendant raises
2. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-9-3(A) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
3. N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-9-3(C), (D) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
4. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-9-4 (Cum. Supp. 1982). Section 31-9-4 provides:
The court may impose any sentence upon a defendant which could be imposed
pursuant to law upon a defendant who has been convicted of the same offense
without a finding of mental illness; provided that if a defendant is sentenced to the
custody of the corrections department, the department shall examine the nature,
extent, continuance and treatment of the defendant's mental illness and shall provide
psychiatric, psychological and other counseling and treatment for the defendant as
it deems necessary.
5. See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 768.36(4) (1982), which provides, "If a defendant who is
found guilty but mentally ill is placed on probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court
pursuant to law, the trial judge, upon recommendation of the center for forensic psychiatry, shall
make treatment a condition of probation."
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the insanity defense. Because the defendant ultimately controls when
GBMI will be raised, a mentally ill defendant might seek to avoid the
GBMI option by not pleading the insanity defense. Instead, he might
claim that his mental illness precluded formation of the requisite mens
rea. A claim that mental illness had negated an essential mens rea would
involve substantially different proof problems than the insanity defense.
Indeed, the burden would be on the state to prove the existence of the
requisite mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt once the defendant came
forward with some evidence of mental illness. Every serious offense
includes a mental state element, and in certain circumstances mental
illness can negate a requisite mental state. 6
There are at least two ways in which the GBMI plea and verdict may
arise in a criminal prosecution. First, the defendant may plead GBMI.
This would most likely arise out of a plea bargain in which a mentally
ill defendant was doubtful about the likelihood of a successful insanity
defense and felt that the plea might make mental care more likely. Such
a plea bargain would probably include an agreement on sentencing. In
such a case, the statute requires that the court receive psychological or
psychiatric reports on the defendant, hold a hearing and satisfy itself that
"there is a factual basis that the defendant was mentally ill at the time
of the offense ... ."17
Second, the state may raise the GBMI verdict in a requested instruction
when the defendant pleads the insanity defense and the court finds that
giving a GBMI instruction would be "warranted by the evidence." It is
difficult to imagine the situation in which a court would give an insanity
defense instruction and not instruct on GBMI. It is less likely, but nevertheless possible, that the prosecution may oppose giving a GBMI instruction because it is confident that it can defeat the insanity defense.
B. Scope of this Article
This article will explore the impact of the new GBMI plea and verdict
in New Mexico. It will discuss the new statute's potential impact on the
insanity defense, on jury deliberations, and its probable effect on the
treatment of mentally and emotionally disturbed prison inmates. This
exploration will be based on informed impressions of the New Mexico
scene, and will draw extensively from the experience of the courts in
Michigan, the first state to adopt a plea and verdict of GBMI. 8 The
Michigan experience is useful for at least three reasons. First, it exem6. N.M. U.J.. Crim. 41.11 (Rept. Pamp. 1982).
7. N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-9-3(C) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
8. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 768.36 (1982).
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plifies the recent history of the insanity defense and the related development of the GBMI plea and verdict. Second, the courts in Michigan
have more fully interpreted Michigan's GBMI statute than have the courts
of any other jurisdiction. Third, the language of the Michigan statute and
the decisions interpreting it reveal basic similarities as well as critical
distinctions between the Michigan and New Mexico versions. The similarities and distinctions illustrate the purposes, problems, and implications of New Mexico's GBMI statute.
The GBMI plea and verdict may have at least two possible groups of
beneficiaries. The statute may provide a proper disposition for those who
are not mentally ill in the legal sense required under the insanity defense,
or the new plea and verdict may seek to provide appropriate treatment
for those who are truly mentally ill for purposes of the insanity defense.
This view of the function of the statute, however, assumes one basic
purpose: that the plea and verdict will provide mental health care to needy
convicts while serving society's need to protect itself and society's right
to punish criminals. The difficulty with this view is that an honest appraisal
of New Mexico's GBMI statute strongly suggests that as a practical
matter, the new statute may only further limit the already infrequent
success of insanity defenses in New Mexico. The principal thrust of this
article is to explore the likely purpose and practical impact of this new
plea and verdict.
II. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF GBMIOPPONENTS OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE PROPOUNDED
THE GBMI VERDICT
Although GBMI provisions are a rather recent innovation in the criminal law, they are an inextricable part of the much more ancient insanity
defense. The defense of "not guilty by reason of insanity" ("NGRI")
has deep roots in the history of the common law. The M'Naghten case
does not represent the genesis, but only a reformulation of the test for
criminal insanity.9 The defense itself was well established in 1843 and
can be traced back as far as the 12th Century. " This longstanding recognition of the insanity defense was grounded in society's fundamental
9. Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 10 CL. & F.200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843). M'Naghten is the
first reported case setting out the insanity defense in its modem formulation:
[To establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that,
at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such
a defect of reason from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality
of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing
what was wrong.
10. Gray, The Insanity Defense: HistoricalDevelopment and Contemporary Relevance, 10 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 559, 559 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gray].
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unwillingness to punish one who is not responsible for his conduct." The
requirement of responsibility is one of the philosophical underpinnings
of the criminal law inherited from England and developed in the United
States.

2

In recent years, there has been increased opposition to the insanity
defense. This opposition has tended to take two forms. Some abolitionists
"[r]ecommend that all evidence regarding defendant's mental abnormality
be excluded from the 'guilty stage' of the criminal proceeding and that
such evidence be taken into account only at the sentencing."' 3 Other
opponents urge the less sweeping approach of excluding evidence of
mental disease or defect unless it is relevant to the mens rea of the offense
charged.' 4 Montana adopted this approach 5 and it was also the essence
of President Nixon's unsuccessful 1972 proposal to abolish the insanity
defense. 6
In 1976, Michigan was the first state to enact a plea and verdict of
GBMI. This enactment was apparently triggered by the public's reaction
to developments which were related to the insanity defense. The Michigan
11.P. Low, J. Jeffries & R. Bonnie, Ciminal Law Cases and Materials (1982) [hereinafter cited
as Low, Jeffries & Bonnie].
Before the 12th century, mental disease, as such, apparently had no legal significance. However, as criminal liability came to be predicated upon general notions
of moral blameworthiness, "madness" was recognized as an excusing condition.
At first, insanity (like self-defense) was not a bar to criminal liability but only a
recognized ground for granting a royal pardon; while the records are fragmentary,
it appears that the king would remand the person to some form of indefinite
custody in lieu of execution. The first recorded case of outright acquittal by reason
of insanity occurred in 1505.
Id. at 643.
12. Fletcher, The Theory of Criminal Negligence, 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 401, 410-15 (1971).
13. Low, Jeffries & Bonnie, supra note 11,at 759. The state of Washington enacted this approach
in 1909 and the Washington Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional in 1910. State v.Strasburg,
60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020 (1910).
14. See, e.g., G. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 843 (1978); Goldstein & Katz, Abolish
the "Insanity Defense"-Whv Not? 72 Yale L.J. 853 (1963); Morris, Psychiatryand the Dangerous
Criminal, 41 S.Cal. L. Rev. 514 (1968).
15. See Mont. Code Ann. §46-14-201 (1981), which provides in part:
(1) Evidence of mental disease or defect is not admissible in a trial on the
merits unless the defendant . . . files a written notice of his purpose to rely on a
mental disease or defect to prove that he did not have a particular state of mind
which is an essential element of the offense charged ...
(2) When the defendant is found not guilty of the charged offense or offenses
or any lesser included offense for the reason that due to a mental disease or defect
he could not have a particular state of mind that is an essential element of the
offense charged, the verdict and judgment shall so state.
This approach would likely preclude some claims which would be successful today under predominant
approaches to the insanity defense. However, some commentators suggest that nothing much would
change. See, e.g., Dershowitz, Abolishing the Insanity Defense: The Most Significant Feature of the
Administration'sProposed Criminal Code-An Essay, 9 Crm. L. Bull. 434, 438-39 (1973).
16. Appelbaum, The Insanity Defense: New Calls for Reform, 33 Hospital and Community Psychiatry 13, 14 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Appelbaum].
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experience tends to support the conclusion that GBMI provisions were a
third form of opposition to the insanity defense and were designed to
undercut that defense.
As the human rights reforms of the 1960's and 1970's spread, they
touched upon the rights of those involuntarily committed for mental or
emotional disturbance. Gradually, the courts began to exercise more control over these commitments, requiring periodic evaluations of progress
and release of persons improperly committed or not requiring further
commitment. 7 In People v. McQuillan,"' the Michigan Supreme Court
decided that due process and equal protection requirements of the United
States Constitution demanded that prior to civil commitment, a hearing
must be held to determine the present sanity of a defendant found NGRI.
Within a year of the decision, 64 inmates in Michigan hospitals were
released following hearings in which they were found presently sane.' 9
In addition, in Michigan, a person found not guilty of a violent crime
by reason of insanity could be released sixty days after acquittal. In a
five-year period, 223 defendants were found NGRI; 124 of these defendants were released as noncommittable according to civil standards
following a sixty-day assessment period. Almost half of the remaining
acquittees were released within five years of acquittal after an average
of nine-and-one-half months of postevaluation hospitalization. Before
another year ended, two of those released had committed additional homicides which were highly publicized. 2 °
These developments confronted the public with a new factor in the
insanity defense equation. Previously,
the outcome for the defendant acquitted by reason of insanity was
almost always the same: indefinite confinement in a maximum security facility. Thus the public could have its moral cake and eat it,
too. Public reluctance to punish those who were not in the same
abstract sense "responsible" for their acts was satisfied, and at the
securely away for
same time the offenders themselves were locked
2
decades in hospitals for the criminally insane. '
The public could no longer be confident of the indefinite confinement of
those found NGRI and became concerned about the implication of insanity
verdicts. In response to the public outcry denouncing the release of dangerous mental patients, the Michigan Legislature passed the GBMI pro17. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967);
Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966); Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
18. 392 Mich. 511, 221 N.W.2d 569 (1974).
19. Comment, Guilty But Mentally Ill: An Historical and Constitutional Analysis. 53 J. Urb. L.
471, 471-72 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment).
20. Appelbaum, supra note 16, at 13-14; Comment, supra note 19, at 472.
21. Appelbaum, supra note 16, at 13.

Winter 1983]

THE GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL

vision. 22 The Michigan experience suggests, then, that GBMI provisions
are reactions to the incidence of successful insanity defenses and the
likelihood of early release for those found criminally insane.
III. EXPLANATION FOR THE GBMI PROVISIONS:

A TOOL TO ABOLISH THE INSANITY DEFENSE
The new plea and verdict of GBMI can be viewed in at least two ways.
On the one hand, it may be seen, as the experience in Michigan suggests,
as an attempt to undermine the insanity defense. On the other hand, it
may represent an effort by the legislature of the State of New Mexico to
reestablish a constructive balance between society's interest in protecting
itself from the dangerously mentally ill and society's longstanding reluctance to punish the mentally ill, while also providing appropriate mental health treatment to those who need it. 23 Of course, the present composition
of the insanity defense and the manner in which those found NGRI are
disposed of reflect the striking of that balance traditionally accepted in
Anglo-American criminal law.24
The public perception, however, of the proper balance between societal
self-protection and the individual rights of mentally ill persons who commit crimes appears to be shifting. This changing perception, the virtually
parallel developments of opposition to the insanity defense, adoption of
the GBMI statute, and the likelihood that no additional mental health care
will be made available, suggest that GBMI is nothing more than an effort
to undercut the insanity defense and not an attempt to reestablish the
traditional balance.
Therefore, the new plea and verdict may be the product of two quite
different tendencies which seek to eliminate the insanity defense. First,
the public, which lacks confidence in the disposition of those found NGRI,
would like to see the insanity defense abolished.2" Second, as noted
earlier, there is a school of thought that issues of mental illness should
condition
generally be raised only at disposition, except where the mental
26
is alleged to preclude a requisite element of the offense.
Certainly, on its face, New Mexico's GBMI provision does not purport
to abolish the insanity defense. The new provision makes clear that only
22. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 768.36 (1982).
23. See People v. Philpot, 98 Mich. App. 257, 296 N.W.2d 229 (1980). In Philpot, the court
stated that the purpose of the guilty but mentally ill statute is to "provide help to those who have
committed a criminal offense while suffering from mental illness even when that mental illness
cannot be said to have totally relieved defendant from all criminal responsibility." Id. at __, 296
N.W.2d at 230.
24. H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility 31 (1968).
25. Appelbaum, supra note 16, at 13.
26. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
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on a finding that a defendant is guilty, mentally ill, and not insane can
he or she be found GBMI. 27 Several reasons underlie the belief, however,
that either or both the motive and/or the effect of the new provision will
be to undercut the insanity defense: 1) the potential for juror confusion
between the NGRI verdict and the GBMI alternative; 2) the potentially
attractive compromise which the new verdict offers jurors; and 3) the
absence of any plausible reason for enacting the new provision other than
its impact on the insanity defense.
A. Potentialfor JurorConfusion
The potential for confusing jurors arises from two features of the GBMI
provision. First, its application in a given case is closely tied to the insanity
defense and its terms, although vague, are similar and yet arguably different from those used to delineate the insanity defense. Second, the
provision will add to the often large number of full or partial mens rea
defenses on which jurors must be instructed, especially in homicide cases.
1) SimilaritiesBetween the GBMI and the NGRI Verdicts
The close tie between the insanity defense and GBMI arises primarily
from the fact that trial consideration of the GBMI verdict is tied to and
triggered by defendant's invocation of the insanity plea.28 The definition
of the new verdict requires a jury determination that defendant was not
legally insane. Thus, under the New Mexico statute, the jury will always
be required to consider defendant's sanity when it considers a verdict of
GBMI. The only role played by the new verdict as described in the statute
itself is that of an alternative to the defense of insanity.
The jury's meaningful choice between the two verdicts might be difficult due to the jury's confusion over the similarities and differences in
the definitions of the two alternatives. Both verdicts require two showings-a mental condition and a consequence caused by that condition.
The conditions may be similar; the requisite results quite different.
The insanity defense requires a "disease of the mind" which has been
defined as "any abnormal condition of the mind which substantially affects
mental or emotional processes and substantially impairs behavior controls," normally extending over a considerable period of time rather large
in extent or degree as distinguished from a sort of momentary insanity
arising from the presence of circumstances. 29 The GBMI statute expressly
27.
28.
29.
N.M.

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-9-3(A) (Cum. Supp.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-9-3(B) (Cum. Supp.
See State v. Nagel, 87 N.M. 434, 437, 535
450, 535 P.2d 657 (1975); see also State v.

1982). See supra note 1.
1982). See supra note 1.
P.2d 641, 644 (Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied. 87
Valenzuela, 90 N.M. 25, 559 P.2d 402 (1976).
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defines its requisite "mental illness" as "a substantial disorder of thought,
mood or behavior which afflicted a person at the time of the commission
of the offense ... ."130
In either case, the condition must be substantial and apparently may
encompass mental, emotional, or behavioral disorders. However, there
are differences. The definition of "diseases of the mind" appears to require
both impairment of behavior controls and impact on either mental or
emotional processes. On the other hand, mental illness permits a finding
of any one of the three types of disorders-mental [thought], emotional
[mood], or behavioral. In addition, while a mental disease must be long3
standing in nature for purposes of the insanity defense, ' the GBMI provision does not include such a requirement.
Although the court makes a threshold determination, the court does
not instruct the jury considering an insanity plea on the definition of
"disease of the mind. "'32 It is not clear under the new GBMI provision
whether the legislature intended that the jury be instructed on the statutory
definition of mental illness. 33 If, as appears likely, no such definitional
instruction is to be given to the jury, the jury will never understand the
relationship between the concepts with regard to their respective requisite
mental conditions and will be applying rules without fully understanding
them. Yet, in deciding whether to give the GBMI instruction, the judge
must distinguish between these concepts. It is not clear what will guide
the courts in this task.
If the differences and similarities in the requisite mental conditions are
unclear, no such vagueness exists with regard to the respective results
that must arise from these mental conditions. In this regard, the two
verdicts vary substantially.
With respect to insanity, New Mexico law requires that one of three
consequences arise from the required disease of the mind: 1) that defendant did not know what he was doing, or understand the consequences
of his act, 2) that he did not know that his act was wrong, or 3) that he
was unable to prevent himself from committing the act. On the other
30. N.M. Star. Ann. § 31-9-3(A) (Cum. Supp. 1982). See supra note 1.
31. State v. White, 58 N.M. 324, 330, 270 P.2d 727, 730 (1954).
32. N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 41.00 (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
33. Presumably, there was no such legislative intent. It would be most confusing for a jury to be
instructed on the definition of mental illness, but not on that of mental disease. Most likely, such
an absurd instruction would lead the jury to apply the GBMI definition of mental illness to the
insanity plea concept of mental disease. As noted above, that might yield an inaccurate definition
of mental disease. If there are no instructions to the jury on these definitions, the vagaries of the
two related but different concepts will fall to the trial court's threshold decision on whether an
instruction should be given on the insanity defense, on the GBMI verdict, or on both. The apparent
differences, similarities, and resultant confusion over the distinctions between the definitions will
not make the judge's decision any easier. See Low, Jeffries & Bonnie, supra note 11, at 652.
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hand, under the GBMI provision, the defendant must be both guilty and
mentally ill, but his mental illness need have nothing to do with his guilt.
The new plea and verdict only requires that the defendant's mental illness
exist at the time of the offense and that it have impaired the defendant's
judgment in some otherwise undefined manner. Beyond the vague reference to impairment of judgment, and the requirement that defendant
be mentally ill at the time of the commission of the crime, there is
seemingly no other requirement of connection between the mental illness
and the criminal conduct under the GBMI provision.
There is an apparent overlap between the mental conditions required
for both the insanity and the GBMI verdict which blurs the distinctions
which exist between these conditions. This potential confusion coupled
with the substantially lesser showing of consequence required for GBMI,
suggests that jurors will often opt for GBMI without full understanding
of the choices. Ultimately, the jury will be left with the rather broad
mission of deciding whether a defendant who pleads NGRI was mentally
ill at the time of the offense and, therefore, should be relieved of responsibility for the offense or, despite having essentially the same mental
illness, is responsible and thus GBMI.
Defendants in Michigan have recognized this potential for confusion
and have challenged their convictions on the ground that the plea and
verdict confuses jurors or is too vague to enforce. The courts in Michigan
have consistently rejected suchchallenges to that state's GBMI statute.
The Michigan challenges have included claims that the jury would be
unable to distinguish between the two verdicts because their definitions
are so vague and overlapping,34 and that the definitions of each are based
upon substantially similar behavioral characteristics and thus essentially
indistinguishable.35 The courts in Michigan have rejected both contentions.
2) Additional Mens Rea Options
The second feature of the GBMI provision, the additional mens rea
options available to a jury, increase the possibility of confusion in choosing between the two verdicts. Insanity and GBMI verdicts are only two
of the substantial array of mens rea options available to a jury. The
34. In People v. Ramsey, 89 Mich. App. 468, 280 N.W. 2d 565 (1979), the Michigan Court of
Appeals held that the definitions were not "so vague and overlapping as to confer upon the trier of
fact unstructured and unlimited discretion .... " Id. at __, 280 N. W.2d at 566.
35. In People v. Soma, 88 Mich. App. 351, 276 N.W.2d 892 (1979), the Michigan Court of
Appeals rejected this claim, conceding that the instructions might not be clearcut but observing:
"The legislature in formulating [the GBMI statute] has established an intermediate category to deal
with situations where a defendant's mental illness does not deprive him of substantial capacity
sufficient to satisfy the insanity test but does warrant treatment in addition to incarceration." Id. at
-,
276 N.W.2d at 896.
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potential for confusion is exemplified by the possibilities that may come
before a jury in a first degree murder case. The jury could be asked to
decide: 1) whether the defendant by virtue of his mental condition was
able to formulate the requisite mens rea of premeditation and deliberation;
2) whether the defendant could even form an intent to kill or the reckless
state of mind required for second degree murder;3 6 3) whether the defendant was NGRI; 37 4) whether the defendant was, because of mental
illness, adequately provoked into killing so as to be guilty only of voluntary manslaughter;38 5) whether diminished capacity arising from mental disease would apply to defendant's case reducing the charge to second
degree murder;3 9 and 6) whether defendant by virtue of his mental illness
was GBMI. 4
Each of the foregoing decisions requires two steps for resolution. They
all require the same threshold determination that the defendant suffer from
some kind of mental illness. Each differs in the second step-identification
of a consequence of that mental illness. These consequences are generally
related to culpability for the crime. The same mental illness might serve
as the basis for the jury's decision about which of the foregoing possibilities to choose. The only difference among them being the often subtle
distinctions among the various consequences of the mental illness.
Thus, the hypothetical jury (after determining that the defendant was
mentally ill) would have to decide whether: 1) the defendant's mental
illness prevented formation of a requisite mens rea; 2) the defendant did
not know what he was doing or understand the consequences of his act,
or did not know that his act was wrong or could not prevent himself from
committing the act; 3) the defendant was reasonably provoked into the
killing on account of his mental illness; 4) because of the mental illness
the defendant was unable to form a "deliberate intent to take away the
life of another"; and 5) the defendant's mental illness impaired his judgment.
This myriad of decisions and minimum of guidance is likely to lead
juries in their confusion down one of two paths-either to greater dependence on expert testimony or to increased tendency to reach compromise verdicts because of their inability to apply the law to the conflicting
and overlapping evidence in a given case. 4 There is already concern
36. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-2-1 (Cum. Supp. 1982); N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 2.00 (Repl. Pamp.
1982); N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 2.10 (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
37. See N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 41.00 (Repi. Pamp. 1982).
38. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-2-3 (1978); N.M. U.J.I. 2.20 (Repi. Pamp. 1982).
39. See N.M. U.J.1. Crim. 41.10 (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
40. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-9-3 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
41. See Hosch, A Comparison of the Influence of Expert Testimony on Jurors, 4 L. Hum. Behav.
297-302 (1980); H. Kalven & H. Zeisel, The American Jury 301-317 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Kalven and Zeisel]; Low, Jeffries & Bonnie, supra note 11, at 652; Comment, supra note 20, at
471.
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among commentators about juror dependence on the expert testimony of
psychiatrists and psychologists in criminal cases involving mental illness.
The concern is that experts will usurp the function of the jury. Jurors, in
their confusion over the multitude of subtle distinctions that must be made
as to the existence and consequences of mental illness, may simply defer
to the expertise of psychologists and psychiatrists. 42 The confusion added
by the new plea and verdict of GBMI will simply compound the problem
and accelerate the trend.
B. The Likelihood of Jury Compromise
The GBMI plea and verdict seem designed to permit jurors a "compromise" between acquittal on grounds of insanity and a simple guilty
verdict. The likelihood of such compromise will arise most emphatically
in cases where the jury is convinced that a defendant is mentally ill, but
fears the possibility of the defendant's release if he is found NGRI.43
"Observations of experimental juries have revealed that a Guilty But
Mentally Ill option is exactly the type of 'middle ground' between the
verdicts of 'guilty' and NGRI that many jurors would prefer.""
Studies show that despite judicial admonitions to the contrary, juries
commonly discuss the consequences of their verdicts. a5 Such discussion
would increase the likelihood of jury compromise to a verdict of GBMI.
Ostensibly, the GBMI verdict suggests by its terms, "guilty but mentally
ill," that the finding of mental illness somehow mitigates the consequences
of a finding of guilt.
In People v. Long,46 the Michigan Court of Appeals suggested that the
plea and verdict of GBMI would deceive jurors into believing that their
compromise is meaningful:
Indeed, upon close inspection it appears that the label of the plea
(or verdict, or finding) is somewhat of a misnomer. To a layperson,
"guilty but mentally ill" may suggest that the culpability, and hence
the punishment, attending the finding of "guilty" is mitigated by the
finding of "mentally ill". However, the statute explicitly provides
that, "If a defendant is found guilty but mentally ill or enters a plea
to that effect which is accepted by the court, the court shall impose
any sentence which could be imposed pursuant to law upon a defendant who is convicted of the same offense." ... The statute
42. See Low, Jeffries & Bonnie, supra note 11, at 652.
43. See Gray, supra note 10, at 579.
44. Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 41, at 197; R. Simon, The Jury and the Defense of Insanity
178 (1967); Cf. Vidmar, Effects of DecisionAlternatives on the Verdicts and Social Perceptions of
Simulated Jurors, 22 J. Personality and Soc. Psychology 211, 215-17 (1972).
45. Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 41, at 197.
46. 86 Mich. App. 676, 273 N.W.2d 519 (1978).
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further provides that a defendant found "guilty but mentally ill" may
have continued treatment at a mental institution made a condition of
parole or probation. .

. In sum, the finding of "mentally ill" can

only serve to aggravate rather than mitigate the restraints on a convicted defendant's liberty. The plea, verdict or finding would more
aptly be "guilty and mentally ill". In its substance, and in its penal
47
consequences, a plea of guilty but mentally ill is a guilty plea."
The impression that the defendant's sentence will be mitigated by the
verdict is even more illusory in New Mexico than in Michigan. The New
Mexico statute not only provides no mitigation of sentence, it leaves
entirely to the judgment of the Department of Corrections the decision
whether and how much treatment or counseling will be provided to one
found GBMI.48 Michigan's statute on the other hand, mandates evaluation
and treatment.49 Thus, in New Mexico, there is not even an assurance of
treatment. The invariable linkage between the GBMI verdict and the
insanity defense suggests a legislative intent to give juries in New Mexico
a compromise alternative to the insanity verdict. The new plea and verdict
can only be raised when a plea of insanity is entered. Although the court
is not mandated to instruct on GBMI in every case where insanity is an
issue, it seems clear that given the similarities between the prerequisite
mental conditions, 5" in the vast majority of insanity plea cases the jury
will be given the GBMI alternative.
Defendants in Michigan have raised the charge that GBMI results in
a compromise verdict and that given a choice between a verdict of GBMI
and NGRI, juries will choose GBMI even though the defendant is truly
insane. The Michigan courts rejected those charges. In People v. Sorna,5"
the jury found the defendant guilty on a charge of armed robbery. The
defendant appealed his conviction stating as one ground that the jury was
misled by the court's instruction and returned a "compromise verdict"
of GBMI rather than a verdict of NGRI. 2 The defendant argued that the
wording of the court's jury instructions prompted the compromise verdict.
The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected the argument and affirmed the
conviction because, "[t]he fact that [the distinctions between insanity and
mental illness] may not appear clear-cut does not warrant a finding of no
rational basis to make them." 53
47. Id. at -,
273 N.W.2d at 523.
48. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-9-4 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
49. People v. Philpot, 98 Mich. App. 257, 296 N.W.2d 229 (1980); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 768.36 (1982).
50. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
51. 88 Mich. App. 351, 276 N.W.2d 892 (1979).
276 N.w.2d at 896.
52. Id. at -,
53. Id.
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The most convincing argument that Michigan's GBMI verdict is a
compromise between a guilty and a NGRI verdict arises from the fact
that juries in Michigan are instructed on the respective consequences of
those verdicts. Knowledge that a defendant will be incarcerated and receive treatment under a GBMI verdict, but may be released after sixty
days if found NGRI, may lead juries to a GBMI verdict rather than a
NGRI verdict.
Traditionally, juries were not to consider the consequences of their
NGRI verdicts because it was considered an irrelevant issue. 54 However,
the Michigan courts have followed the reasoning in Lyles v. United States,55
in which a federal appellate court concluded that there is no general
understanding of what happens if a NGRI verdict is returned as opposed
to general knowledge as to the consequences of a guilty verdict.5 6 The
federal court thought it was important for the jury to be instructed that
NGRI means neither freedom nor punishment but, in most states, automatic commitment. In People v. Tenbrink,57 the Michigan Court of Ap-

peals applied the Lyles reasoning to the GBMI verdict. The Tenbrink court
decided that juries are equally uninformed as to the disposition of the
defendant found GBMI. The court held that not only could an instruction
on the disposition of a GBMI verdict be given but that the judge, sua
sponte, could so inform the jury, even over the objection of the defense. 8
Present New Mexico law does not permit an instruction on the disposition of a defendant found NGRI. 59 Two years ago, in State v. Lujan,"
the New Mexico Supreme Court said, "It]hey [the jury] are to patiently
and dispassionately weigh the evidence and arrive at a verdict in accordance with the law as given to them by the court. To instruct them on the
consequences of the verdict would add an element to their deliberations
that is not proper." 6 Because New Mexico has not adopted the policy
of instructing on the consequences of the NGRI verdict (the basis for the
54. People v. Samuelson, 75 Mich. App. 228, 254 N.W.2d 849 (1977).
55. 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 961 (1958).
56. In People v. Cole, 382 Mich. 695, 172 N.W.2d 354 (1969), the court stated that it would
follow the reasoning of Lyles and instruct juries on disposition of the defendant if defendant is found
NGRI.
57. 93 Mich. App. 326, 287 N.W.2d 223 (1980).
58. In People v. Rone, 101 Mich. App. 811, 300 N.W.2d 705 (1981) vacated and remanded,
Mich. -,
311 N.W.2d 702 (1981), the court confirmed the holding that a judge may sua
sponte inform the jury of the consequnces of a GBMI verdict. Although People v. Rone is presently
on remand, the Michigan Court of Appeals reiterated its position that a trial judge has independent
authority to instruct the jury on the consequences of a GBMI verdict over an objection by defense
counsel in People v. Goad, 109 Mich. App. 726, 311 N.W.2d 457, 458 (1981).
59. State v. Luna, 93 N.M. 773, 606 P.2d 183 (1980); State v. Chambers, 84 N.M. 309, 502
P.2d 999 (1972).
60. 94 N.M. 232, 608 P.2d 1114 (1980).
61. Id. at 234, 608 P.2d at 1116.
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Michigan decision to allow an instruction on the GBMI verdict), it is
unlikely that New Mexico will allow an instruction on the consequences
of a GBMI verdict.
Therefore, in New Mexico, the likelihood of GBMI as a compromise
verdict is heightened when compared with Michigan. The tendency of
juries to discuss the consequences of their verdicts, no matter what instructions they receive, could create essentially the same situation in New
Mexico with the added disadvantage that the court would not accurately
and officially inform the jurors of the consequences of their verdict.
C. The Need for the GBMI Verdict in New Mexico
1) Few Defendants Successfully Raise NGRI Defense
New Mexico's GBMI statute is virtually identical to the Michigan
provision." Our state's experience with the insanity defense is, however,
quite different. Michigan had substantial numbers of successful insanity
pleas prior to passage of their GBMI statute. Although hard data is currently unavailable in New Mexico, professionals in the mental health,
corrections, and criminal justice fields agree that few defendants in New
Mexico have successfully raised the NGRI defense. Most defendants who
have raised mens rea defenses are found guilty. If mental treatment is
necessary, the Department of Corrections may supervise provision of such
treatment. One experienced New Mexico forensic psychologist, Dr. Elliot
Rappaport, stated that in his eight years of interviewing and testifying
on behalf of defendants seeking NGRI verdicts, he had not seen one
successful insanity defense.63 Presently, there are no patients at the New
Mexico State Hospital in Las Vegas, New Mexico, who were civilly
committed after being found NGRI. 6
Dr. Richard Fink, another psychologist with extensive experience in
New Mexico, found that defendants who exhibited signs of insanity were
sent to the Forensic Hospital to determine their competency to stand trial.
The charges against those who were never deemed competent usually
were dropped and such patients were then civilly committed. If the charges
against the patient committed for determination of competence were not
serious, they were usually dropped soon after admission, and then civil
62. The major difference is that Michigan's enactment provides in detail for the disposition of
one found or pleading GBMI. New Mexico's statute is very sketchy and leaves virtually total
discretion to the Department of Corrections.
63. Interview with Dr. Elliot Rappaport, Clinical Psychologist, former Director of the Forensic
Hospital, Las Vegas, New Mexico (1966-1969), former Director (1979-1981 ), and present consultant
to the Forensic Evaluation Team, Santa Fe, New Mexico (Feb. 17, 1982).
64. Interview with Dr. Richard Fink, Chief Psychologist, Forensic Hospital, Las Vegas, New
Mexico (March 24, 1982).
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commitment took place. Dr. Fink knew of no cases in which a defendant
was found competent, stood trial, was found NGRI at the time of the
offense, and was then civilly committed. His belief is that most are
convicted and then sentenced. Indeed, the Forensic Hospital presently
holds many patients admitted after conviction.6" Based on Dr. Fink's
experience, it might be concluded that one reason for the already low
rate of success of NGRI pleas in New Mexico may be that many of the
colorable insanity claims are effectively eliminated at the competency
determination stage. In the case of serious offenses, defendants may be
held at the Forensic Hospital for diagnosis until they can be tried, or they
are simply civilly committed. Lesser offenders are moved more expeditiously out of the criminal process and into civil commitment.
In any event, the mentally ill are dealt with at two levels in the criminal
justice system. Pretrial defendants, many of those who would subsequently plead NGRI, are either held at the Forensic Hospital or civilly
committed after some level of competency proceeding. After conviction,
and at the discretion of the Department of Corrections, some of the
mentally ill are admitted to the Forensic Hospital on referral from the
Department of Corrections. It does seem clear, however, that very few
insanity pleas are successful in New Mexico.
2) Potentialfor Early Release of DangerousPersons Civilly
Committed
In another regard, however, the New Mexico scene is quite similar to
that in Michigan where early release of the mentally ill is also a substantial
possibility. New Mexico law provides that following a NGRI verdict the
prosecutor must instigate civil, involuntary commitment proceedings against
the acquitted defendant. 66 The defendant may first be committed on any
emergency basis 67 or for a thirty-day period. 68 Within twenty-one days
of commitment under the thirty-day statute, a petition may be filed to
extend the commitment for six months. "[W]hen the client has been
committed for two consecutive periods of commitment, any commitment
commencing thereafter shall not exceed one year. "69 Thus, in New Mexico it is possible for a defendant acquitted of a violent crime by reason
of insanity to be released after thirty days or six months of commitment.
With successive hearings he may end up with an indefinite commitment,
but not without periodic reviews of present sanity.
The standard for emergency civil commitment is different than the
standard for legal insanity. Emergency civil commitment requires a person
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
N.M.R. Crim. P. 35(a)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
N.M. Stat. Ann. §43-1-10 (Repl. Pamp. 1979).
N.M. Stat. Ann. §43-1-11 (Repl. Pamp. 1979).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-12(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1979).
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to have "a mental disorder [which] presents a likelihood of serious harm
to himself or others. "7 Similarly, commitment for thirty days requires
"a description of the specific behavior or symptoms of the client which
evidence a likelihood of serious harm to the client or others. . .. " The
six-month commitment statute requires a hearing at which it is determined
"by clear and convincing evidence that the client presents a likelihood
of harm to himself or others, that extended treatment is likely to improve
the client's condition and that the proposed extended commitment is
"'
consistent with the least drastic means principle ...
As discussed above, much of the public concern over the insanity
defense has arisen from the potential for early and perhaps improper
release of dangerous persons civilly committed after a verdict of NGRI.
Given New Mexico's treatment of mentally ill defendants, it may be that
this concern is misplaced on two counts. First, the low incidence of
successful insanity defenses minimizes whatever public exposure there
may be to danger from that source. Second, it may be that competency
procedures are the most significant source of civil commitment diversions
from the criminal justice system.
D. Likely Effect on Treatment of Mentally and Emotionally Disturbed
Prison Inmates
Under the New Mexico GBMI statute, the Department of Corrections
is not required to provide mental health care to those found GBMI. It is
only required to evaluate their mental condition and provide such care
"as it deems necessary."73
The new provision adds nothing to the legal rights of New Mexico
inmates to mental health care. The stipulated agreement among the parties
in Duran v. King74 adopted by the United States District Court for the
District of New Mexico in its Order of July 14, 1980, went well beyond
the vague language of the GBMI statute in setting out mental health care
rights of New Mexico inmates. 75 The agreement required that "all [inmates] who are in need of mental health care as determined by a qualified
care and/or treatment propractitioner, will be identified and the needed
76
needed."
when
provided
be
will
grams
Unfortunately, the mental health-care provisions in the agreement have
not been fully effective. New Mexico has special problems within its
70. N.M. Stat. Ann. §43-1-10(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1979).
71. N.M. Stat. Ann. §43-1-11(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1979).
72. N.M. Stat. Ann. §43-1-12(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1979). This statute also gives the client the right
to have a trial by a six-person jury if requested.
73. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-9-4 (Cum. Supp. 1982). See supra note 4 for text of statute.
74. Circuit No. 77-721-C (1980).
75. Id.
76. Id.
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Department of Corrections as illustrated by the riot at the State Penitentiary in February 1980. New Mexico also has limited treatment facilities
for the inmates presently in need of counseling. Mental treatment facilities
at the penitentiary itself presently consist of thirty beds for long-term
treatment at the Forensic Hospital and some room at the penitentiary for
short-term care. The second floor of the penitentiary is being remodeled
to add twelve to twenty more beds but these will not be suited for longterm care. 77
The Department of Corrections issued a report on the impact of the
GBMI bill when it was proposed. The report indicated that, if passed,
the bill would have significant budgetary implications and that based on
the Michigan experience, the number of commitments increases when
this intermediate plea and verdict becomes available.7" To meet the anticipated increase the report indicates an additional forty beds would be
needed at the Forensic Hospital, along with staff and equipment and
available out-patient treatment when necessary at a proposed cost of
$400,00.00. 7 9 The legislature made no such appropriation when it enacted
the GBMI provision. The Department of Corrections signed a federal
court consent decree after the riot to provide psychiatric treatment to the
inmates who survived the riot. At this time there is a six-month waiting
list for inmates in Santa Fe in need of pre-prosecutory and post-prosecutory evaluations.8 0
Thus, it is likely that if there is an increase in demand for forensic
services from the Department of Corrections, that demand will merely
create greater backlogs in services. The wording of the new law, however,
allows the Department to provide that which it "deems necessary." A
Department official called this language an "escape clause" which allows
the Department to provide treatment at its option and according to its
capital outlay.8 ' In sum, little jn the way of increased mental health care
for inmates is likely to emerge from the enactment of the GBMI provision.
In Michigan several defendants challenged their GBMI convictions by
claiming that after sentencing they did not receive requisite treatment.
The defendants requested either a reversal of their convictions or withdrawal of their pleas. 2 In People v. Sorna,83 the court held that the proper
remedy was not reversal or withdrawal, but mandamus:
77. Interview with John Ramming, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Corrections, Santa Fe,
New Mexico (Feb. 26, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Interview with John Ramming].
78. N.M. Dep't of Corrections Internal Report (Feb. 11, 1982).
79. Id; Interview with John Ramming, supra note 77.
80. Interview with Robert Garcia, Acting Director of the Behavioral Health and Residential
Treatment Division of the Health and Environment Department, Santa Fe, New Mexico (Feb. 26,
1982).
81. Interview with John Ramming, supra note 77.
82. People v. Mack, 104 Mich. App. 560, 305 N.W.2d 264 (1981); People v. Thomas, 96 Mich.
App. 210, 292 N.W.2d 523 (1980); People v. Ramsey, 89 Mich. App. 468, 280 N.W.2d 565 (1979);
People v. Sharif, 87 Mich. App. 196, 274 N.W.2d 17 (1979).
83. 88 Mich. App. 351, 276 N.W.2d 892 (1979).
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If the Department of Corrections is failing to meet its statutory obligation to provide the psychiatrically-indicated treatment for the
defendant and other inmates
then the appropriate remedy would
be a complaint for a Writ of Mandamus to the Department of Corrections to enforce its duty under the statute, rather than reversal of
defendant's conviction.'
It is unlikely that New Mexico's courts will recognize such a duty because
the Michigan statute expressly requires mental health care for GBMI
defendants, while New Mexico's provision does not.85 Even when a
defendant is found GBMI, the Department of Corrections is only obligated
to "examine the nature, extent, continuance and treatment of the defendant's mental illness ...."86 Beyond that, the Department need only
provide care which "it deems necessary." Under these circumstances,
mandamus in New Mexico is unlikely to be useful as a remedy for nontreatment. 87

IV. CONCLUSION
There are, as a practical matter, two ways of viewing the purpose of
the GBMI plea and verdict. On the one hand, it can be seen as an effort
to undercut the defense of insanity arising from a lack of confidence that
civil commitment meets the legitimate interest of societal self-protection.
On the other hand, the GBMI verdict may be perceived as an effort to
provide needed mental health care for those who are not criminally insane,
but are in need of such treatment.
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the GBMI statute adds
nothing to existing alternatives for treatment of mentally ill defendants.
The new plea and verdict does not then serve the purpose of enhancing
the available treatment option. Moreover, although the statute may well
undercut the insanity defense in New Mexico, it leaves the statutory civil
commitment procedures untouched and thus does little, if anything, to
reduce the possibility of improper release of dangerous persons under
civil commitment.

84. Id. at -, 276 N.W.2d at 897.
85. N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-9-4 (Cum. Supp. 1982). See supra note 4 for text of statute.
86. N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-9-4 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
87. An argument can be made that in a capital case, the GBMI verdict may prevent execution
of the death penalty. For this to be the case, however, the new statute must provide some semblance
of fight to mental health treatment for defendants found GBM1. As discussed, the statutory language
appears to provide no such fight but rather to leave provision of care to the complete discretion of
the Department of Corrections. Only if the verdict's determination of GBMI is meaningful and
creates a fight to mental treatment could a capital sentence be stopped even temporarily.

